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The Uncertain Status of the Manifest




The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) enables parties to ob-
tain quick and final resolution to disputes without incurring the
costs, delays, and occasional publicity of litigation.  Indeed, sec-
tion 10 of the FAA enumerates four specific grounds on which
courts may vacate arbitral awards:  corruption, fraud, impartial-
ity, and misconduct or incompetence.  Yet over the past 60 years,
a debate has raged over the existence of an additional ground:
the arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law.
The Supreme Court first enounced this standard in dicta in
its 1953 decision in Wilko v. Swan.  Over next four decades, every
federal circuit court slowly adopted the standard as binding law.
However, in 2008, the Court cast doubt on the standard’s univer-
sal acceptance when it issued its decision in Hall Street Associ-
ates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.  The majority in Hall Street questioned
whether Wilko’s use of the term “manifest disregard” merely re-
ferred to the aggregate effect of the enumerated section 10
grounds rather than a new standard of review.  The Court’s
equivocation has inevitably led to a circuit split, with three cir-
cuits permitting vacatur based on an arbitrator’s manifest disre-
gard of the law, four circuits holding that Hall Street invalidated
the manifest disregard standard, another circuit holding that the
standard both is and is not valid, and four circuits refusing to
decide the issue altogether.
This Article examines the evolution of the manifest disre-
gard standard and the ramifications of Hall Street, including the
current circuit split and the practical effect of the standard’s
availability on arbitration decisions at both the federal and state
levels.  The Article asserts that until the Supreme Court ad-
dresses the issue, an incentive to shop for a jurisdiction that en-
* Stuart Boyarsky is an attorney in New York and the Social Media Chair of the
American Bar Association’s Arbitration Committee.  The views expressed herein
are solely those of the author.
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tertains a manifest disregard challenge will exist, thereby
defeating the bedrock principle of the FAA:  finality.
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INTRODUCTION
“[T]he Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congres-
sional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building
instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”
—Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson1
There are numerous reasons for the spike in arbitration over
the past half-century.2  Parties view arbitration as a faster and less
1. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
2. See Bradley T. King, Note, “Through Fault of Their Own”—Applying Bon-
ner Mall’s Extraordinary Circumstances Test to Heightened Standard of Review
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expensive alternative to litigation.3  The proceedings are kept
strictly confidential, and the awards are given a degree of finality
not found in litigation.4  Without this finality, arbitration would pro-
vide nothing more than a “system of ‘junior varsity trial courts’”5
and “be a mere prelude to, and not a substitute for, litigation.”6
Despite this finality, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)7 pro-
vides four explicit circumstances in which federal courts may vacate
an arbitral award:  if a party procured an award by corruption, if
evidence of an arbitrator’s partiality exists, if the arbitrator refused
to postpone the arbitral hearing despite a request showing good
cause or to consider material evidence, or if the arbitrators ex-
ceeded their powers.8
Yet, in its 1953 decision in Wilko v. Swan,9 the Supreme Court
seemingly expanded those circumstances and set forth what the fed-
eral circuit courts would come to view as a new criterion for vaca-
tur:  an arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law.10  While the
Court has refrained from explicitly approving the standard, every
federal circuit court slowly adopted it over the four decades that
followed Wilko.11  But did Wilko indeed provide a new extra-statu-
tory ground for overturning an arbitrator’s award, or had the Court
merely rephrased one of the FAA’s enumerated bases for vacatur?
The uncertainty led Judge Posner to lament:
We can understand neither the need for the formula nor the role
that it plays in judicial review of arbitration (we suspect none—
that it is just words).  If it is meant to smuggle review for clear
error in by the back door, it is inconsistent with the entire mod-
ern law of arbitration.  If it is intended to be synonymous with
the statutory formula that it most nearly resembles—whether the
Clauses, 45 B.C. L. REV. 943, 944–45 (2004) (discussing reasons for the increasing
prevalence of arbitration).
3. See id. at 945.
4. See DMA Int’l, Inc. v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 585 F.3d 1341, 1344
(10th Cir. 2009) (“Once an arbitration award is entered, the finality of arbitration
weighs heavily in its favor and cannot be upset except under exceptional circum-
stances.” (quoting Ormsbee Dev. Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140, 1146–47 (10th Cir.
1982))).
5. Williams v. Katten, Muchen & Zavis, No. 92 C 5654, 1996 WL 717447, at *6
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 1996) (quoting Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250,
1254 (7th Cir. 1994)).
6. King, supra note 2, at 945.
7. United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2018).
8. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
9. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
10. See id. at 435–38.
11. See infra Part I.B.1–3.
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arbitrators ‘exceeded their powers’—it is superfluous and confus-
ing.  There is enough confusion in the law.12
Over 50 years had passed before the Court chose to address
the issue again.  And even then Justice Souter, writing for the ma-
jority, appeared to hedge his bets.  Writing for a divided Supreme
Court in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,13 Justice Sou-
ter stated, “Maybe the term ‘manifest disregard’ was meant to
name a new ground for review, but maybe it merely referred to the
§ 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to them.”14  Rather
than clarifying the uncertainty surrounding Wilko, Hall Street added
to the confusion and eventually generated a fragmented split
among the federal circuit courts.  The result:  three circuits now per-
mit the use of manifest disregard as a viable ground for vacatur,
four circuits have held that the manifest disregard standard no
longer exists after Hall Street, one circuit has held that the standard
both does and does not survive Hall Street, and four circuits have
refused to decide the issue one way or the other.15  Given that par-
ties generally enter into arbitration agreements to secure a degree
of certainty and predictability not found in litigation,16 this poten-
tial lack of finality, which is based solely on the circuit in which the
arbitration occurred, is a worrisome development.17  The Supreme
Court’s apparent refusal to address adequately the manifest disre-
gard standard’s viability is even more perplexing;  the Court has
since denied three petitions for writ of certiorari on the issue in
200918 and another in 2014.19
This Article examines the evolution of the manifest disregard
standard and the ramifications of Hall Street, including the current
circuit split and the practical effects that the standard has had on
arbitration decisions at the federal and state levels.   Part I discusses
the standard’s emergence in Wilko as well as the federal circuit
12. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994).
13. Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
14. Id. at 585.
15. For a discussion of the circuit split, see infra Part II.B.1–4.
16. ZHENG SOPHIA TANG, JURISDICTION AND ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW 1 (2014).
17. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12, Walia v. Dewan, 134 S. Ct. 1788
(2014) (No. 13-722) (“The courts of appeals are divided . . . over whether ‘manifest
disregard’ survived Hall Street.  This divergence is untenable, as it subjects arbitral
awards to different standards of review based entirely on the happenstance of
where they are rendered.”).
18. See Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, LLC, 558 U.S. 819 (2009); Grain v. Trin-
ity Health, 558 U.S. 820 (2009); Improv W. Assocs. v. Comedy Club, Inc., 558 U.S.
824 (2009).
19. See Walia, 134 S. Ct. 1788.
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courts’ slow adoption of that standard over the course of 40 years.
Part II examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street and
the resulting circuit split.  Part III focuses on the Court’s missed
opportunities to settle the circuit split and the standard’s impact on
a party’s ability to overturn an award.  This Article concludes by
arguing that until the Supreme Court addresses the issue, an incen-
tive to shop for a jurisdiction that entertains the manifest disregard
standard will exist and thereby defeat the FAA’s bedrock principle
of finality.20
I. WILKO AND ITS UNIVERSAL APPLICATION
Beginning with the 1925 enactment of the FAA, courts uni-
formly rejected claims of an arbitrator’s disregard of the law as
grounds for vacating awards.21  This rejection was rooted in the
FAA’s explicit list of four grounds upon which a court may vacate
an arbitral award.22
In fact, at the time of the decision, many viewed Wilko as
solely addressing whether parties could compel investors to bring
fraud claims under the Securities Act of 193323 (“Securities Act”) in
arbitration rather than in court.  The issue of whether an arbitra-
tor’s manifest disregard of the law constitutes grounds for vacating
an arbitral award was neither raised by the parties nor adopted by
the Court.  Nevertheless, it was the viability of the manifest disre-
gard standard for which the case soon became known.  The unfore-
seen ramifications of what can be best described as a throw-away
line24 continues to cause uncertainty over the scope of review of an
arbitrator’s decision.
20. As the Second Circuit explained:  “[P]arties choose to arbitrate because
they want quick and final resolution of their disputes.”  Florasynth, Inc. v.
Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 177 (2d Cir. 1984).
21. See, e.g., James Richardson & Sons, Ltd. v. W. E. Hedger Transp. Corp.,
98 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1938) (“This court is without power to amend or overrule
merely because of disagreement with matters of law or facts determined by the
arbitrators.”); The Hartbridge, 62 F.2d 72, 73 (2d Cir. 1932).
22. The first three grounds focus on the fairness and impartiality of the arbi-
tral process. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(3) (2018); see also Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147 (1968) (“[Section 10(a)(1)–(3)] show[s]
a desire of Congress to provide not merely for any arbitration but for an impartial
one.”).  The fourth ground allows for vacatur when the arbitrators have “exceeded
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
23. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2018).
24. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953) (“[T]he interpretations of
the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the
federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”); see also infra Part
I.A.
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A. Wilko v. Swan
Wilko involved an action brought by an investor claiming that
his broker had violated the Securities Act by fraudulently mislead-
ing him into buying stock.25  The broker moved to stay the proceed-
ings pursuant to a clause in the customer agreement that mandated
the parties to settle all disputes through arbitration.26  The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York denied the mo-
tion explaining that “the intent of Congress was to require that the
provisions of the Securities Act should be strictly complied with” to
fully protect purchasers of securities.27  Enforcing the arbitration
clause would run contrary to this intent, the court explained, as
most purchasers of securities do not read the small-font provisions
before signing the agreements and are therefore unaware that they
have waived their Securities Act remedies.28
A divided Second Circuit reversed and remanded the case.
Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Swan explained that “[t]here
is good reason why [an investor] may prefer to seek enforcement of
his statutory right to damages through the speedy remedy of arbi-
tration rather than by the long-delayed remedy of trial in the
courts.”29  Moreover, Judge Swan explained, “[i]f Congress had in-
tended to forbid arbitration in a suit based on [the Securities Act],
we believe it would have expressed such intent.”30
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether
an agreement to arbitrate future controversies conflicted with the
Securities Act’s provision that allows claimants to bring actions in
state or federal court.31  The Court explained that the policies be-
hind the FAA and the Securities Act32 were not “easily reconcila-
ble.”33  While Congress, through the FAA, afforded parties the
ability to agree to use mechanisms that provide prompt solutions to
25. See Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
26. Id. at 76–77.
27. Id. at 77.
28. Id.
29. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1953).
30. Id. at 445.
31. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953).
32. Congress passed the Securities Act intending to ensure that buyers of se-
curities would receive accurate and complete information prior to making invest-
ments. Id. at 430–31.  Moreover, the Securities Act created a special right for
investors to recover for misrepresentations in both state and federal court. Id. at
431.  By contrast, Congress created the FAA to codify the desirability of avoiding
the delay and expense of litigation. Id. at 431–32.  Although the FAA is “use[ful]
both in controversies based on statues or on standards otherwise created,” it does
not have the same protections as a judicial proceeding. Id.
33. Id. at 438.
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their disputes, Congress also specifically enacted the Securities Act
to protect investor rights and forbade the waiver of any such right,
including the ability to bring an action in court.34  The Court thus
ruled that “the intention of Congress concerning the sale of securi-
ties is better carried out by holding invalid such an agreement for
arbitration of issues arising under the [Securities] Act.”35  The
Court detailed several shortcomings of the arbitration process, such
as an arbitrator’s ability to make an arbitral award without explana-
tion and a court’s inability to examine the arbitrator’s understand-
ing of the Securities Act’s statutory requirements—such as
“‘burden of proof,’ ‘reasonable care,’ or ‘material fact.’”36  Al-
though the Court seemingly agreed with the Second Circuit’s belief
that the arbitrator’s failure to issue a decision in accordance with
the Securities Act would warrant vacating the award, the Court ex-
plained that such failure would need to be clear, which would be
unlikely since arbitrators are not required to issue written explana-
tions for their decisions.37  This reasoning led the Court to issue its
puzzling statement:  “[T]he interpretations of the law by the arbi-
trators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the fed-
eral courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”38
But where did this “manifest disregard” standard come from?
Section 10 of the FAA enumerates four specific grounds on which
courts may vacate arbitral awards:  corruption, fraud, impartiality,
and misconduct or incompetence.39  For the most part, these
grounds involve instances of bias or procedural unfairness.  In fact,
the only provision that appears to address errors of substantive law
deals with arbitrators who exceed their powers,40 and that provision
“has been narrowly construed to apply only when arbitrators decide
issues not presented to them or grant relief not authorized in the
34. Id.
35. Id.  The Supreme Court later limited its holding in Wilko by holding
claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which governs the secondary
market, arbitrable. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
238 (1987).  The Court overruled Wilko altogether in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/Am. Express, Inc., ruling that claims under the Securities Act of 1933, which
regulates trading in the primary market, must be arbitrated as per the customer
agreement.  490 U.S. 477, 480–84 (1989).
36. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 436–37 (emphasis added).  Justice Frankfurter was even more
straightforward in his Wilko dissent where he stated that “[a]rbitrators may not
disregard the law.” Id. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
39. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4) (2018).
40. LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 39:2 (3d
ed. 2003).
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arbitration agreement.”41  The FAA nowhere mentions an arbitra-
tor’s “manifest disregard” of the law as grounds for vacatur.  Thus,
with its statement in Wilko, the Court appeared to return to a deci-
sion it had issued nearly one century prior.
In 1874, the Court stated in United States v. Farragut42 that
courts could set aside arbitral decisions for a number of reasons,
including “for manifest mistake of law.”43  But that case was de-
cided at a time when courts commonly refused to find arbitration
agreements binding and instead held that either party could revoke
a pre-dispute arbitration agreement at any time.44  It was not until
the FAA’s adoption that Congress placed arbitration agreements
on equal footing with other contracts45 and thus established a fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration.46  Moreover, while the Supreme
Court in Farragut listed a number of reasons for overturning an ar-
bitral award,47 Congress codified only two of those reasons in the
FAA:  exceeding an arbitrator’s powers and fraud.48  Congress’s ex-
plicit refusal to include manifest mistake of the law in the FAA
raises the question of why the Court chose to mention the standard,
albeit in dicta, in Wilko.
It is therefore understandable that circuit courts were initially
confused as to whether manifest disregard of the law indeed repre-
sented a new judicially constructed standard by which courts could
41. Id.
42. United States v. Farragut, 89 U.S. 406, 420 (1874).
43. Id.  Farragut involved a dispute between the United States Treasury De-
partment and Union Admiral David Farragut and others concerning the value of
Confederate property that was seized in 1862 during the Battle of New Orleans
and considered a lawful prize of war. Id. at 408–12.
44. See Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 450 (1874) (“There is no sound
principle upon which such [arbitration] agreements can be specifically enforced.”);
Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90 F. 639, 642 (3d Cir. 1898) (stating courts will not enforce
contracts that “oust the jurisdiction of the courts, and substitute for them an extra-
legal tribunal of their own creation, with power to finally and conclusively decide”
a dispute.); Jones v. Enoree Power Co., 75 S.E. 452, 454 (S.C. 1912) (“An agree-
ment to submit to arbitration all questions of law and fact that may arise under a
contract is contrary to the public policy and void, as an attempt to oust the courts
of their jurisdiction and establish in their place a contract tribunal.”); Parsons v.
Ambos, 48 S.E. 696, 697 (Ga. 1904) (“The mere executory agreement to submit [to
arbitration] is generally revocable, otherwise nothing would be easier than for the
more astute party to oust the courts of jurisdiction.”).
45. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974).
46. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25
(1983).
47. These reasons include:  “exceeding the power conferred by the submis-
sion, [ ] manifest mistake of law, [ ] fraud, and [ ] all other reasons on which awards
are set aside in other courts of law or chancery.” Farragut, 89 U.S. at 420.
48. Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The “Manifest Disre-
gard of the Law” Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 149 (2011).
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overturn arbitration awards.  As the Ninth Circuit lamented in San
Martine Compania de Navegazione S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals
Ltd.:49
[T]he Supreme Court’s use of the words ‘manifest disregard’, has
caused us trouble here.  Conceivably the words may have been
used to indicate that whether an award may be set aside for er-
rors of law would be a question of degree.  Thus, if the award was
based upon a mistaken view of the law, but in their assumption of
what the law was, the arbitrators had not gone too far afield,
then, the award would stand; but if the error is an egregious one,
such as no sensible layman would be guilty of, then the award
could be set aside.  Such a “degree of error” test would, we think,
be most difficult to apply.  Results would likely vary from judge
to judge.  We believe this is not what the court had in mind when
it spoke of ‘manifest disregard’.50
Similarly, the Second Circuit addressed the manifest disregard
standard in Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs International Traders,
Inc.51  In Saxis, the District Court for the Eastern District of New
York had affirmed an arbitration award stemming from a maritime
dispute between an owner of a ship and the company that chartered
it.52  The Second Circuit explained that a court could vacate the
award only if a party proved that one of the specific section 10
grounds existed.53  Moreover, the court stated, “We have made it
quite clear on earlier occasions that it is the function neither of this
court nor the district courts to review the record of the arbitration
proceedings for errors of law or fact.”54
It only took one year for the Second Circuit to change its mind.
B. Manifest Disregard’s Slow Adoption
1. The 1960s
Reversing course from its decision in Saxis, the Second Circuit
in Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. International Milling Co.55 became the
first court to acknowledge the manifest disregard standard as a
valid criterion for reviewing arbitral awards. Trafalgar Shipping in-
49. San Martine Compania de Navegazione S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd.,
293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1961).
50. Id. at 801 n.4.
51. Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs Int’l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 579–81
(2d Cir. 1967).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 581.
54. Id. at 581–82.
55. Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. Int’l Milling Co., 401 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1968).
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volved a dispute between the owner of a cargo ship and the defen-
dant who, after chartering the vessel, caused it to run aground while
entering a Venezuelan harbor.56  When settlement negotiations
over damages broke down, the plaintiff moved to compel arbitra-
tion pursuant to the charter.57  The defendant refused, arguing that
the doctrine of laches barred the plaintiff’s right to arbitrate due to
the plaintiff’s long delay in asserting its claim.58  The district court
ruled that whether the defense of laches bars arbitration is an issue
for the courts, but the Second Circuit reversed explaining that in
issues of admiralty, the severity of a delay to bring a claim would be
best determined by an arbitrator, not a judge.59  Perhaps in an ef-
fort to allay the defendant’s concerns, the Second Circuit cited both
section 10 of the FAA and Wilko, adding that “an arbitration award
is subject to review in the courts for misbehavior of the arbitrators,
or manifest disregard of the law.”60
In the years following Trafalgar, the Second Circuit continued
to acknowledge the manifest disregard standard but each time
stopped short of applying the standard to overturn an arbitral
award.61   However, the court proved that its continued references
to the standard were not purely academic when it found that an
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in Halligan v. Piper Jaf-
fray, Inc.62  In reaching its conclusion, the court explained that “[i]n
view of the strong evidence that Halligan was fired because of his
age and the agreement of the parties that the arbitrators were cor-
rectly advised of the applicable legal principles, we are inclined to
hold that they ignored the law or the evidence or both.”63
A year after the Second Circuit first acknowledged the mani-
fest disregard standard in Trafalgar, the Third Circuit was
presented with a situation in which a district court vacated a labor
arbitration award based on its belief that the arbitrator exceeded its
authority.64  The dispute in Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Co. v.
56. Id. at 569.
57. Id. at 570.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 572.
60. Id. at 572–73 (citations omitted).
61. See, e.g., Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 352 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[Manifest
disregard of the law] requires something beyond and different from a mere error in
the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law.”);
Sobel v. Hertz Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972) (“[I]f the arbitra-
tors simply ignore the applicable law, the literal application of a ‘manifest disre-
gard’ standard should presumably compel vacation of the award.”).
62. Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
63. Id. at 198.
64. See Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1969).
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Fletcher65 centered on a newly hired employee’s promotion despite
a collective bargaining agreement that expressly required the em-
ployer to base promotions on seniority.66  Notwithstanding that
provision, the arbitrator permitted the promotion.67  The district
court vacated the award, explaining that the award violated the ex-
press language of the collective bargaining agreement.68  The Third
Circuit reversed reasoning that “the interpretation of labor arbitra-
tors must not be disturbed so long as they are not in ‘manifest disre-
gard’ of the law, and that ‘whether the arbitrators misconstrued the
contract’ does not open the award for judicial review.”69
Despite the quick succession of the Second and Third Circuits’
decisions, Trafalgar and Ludwig Honold did not appear to be the
bellwether of widespread adoption of the new standard, as the vast
majority of circuit courts continued to rely solely on the FAA’s stat-
utory grounds for overturning arbitral awards.  Nevertheless, after a
decade of relative judicial uniformity, the 1980s saw four additional
circuit courts adopt the manifest disregard standard.
2. The 1980s
The Sixth Circuit was the next circuit court to deem the mani-
fest disregard standard valid in Anaconda Co. v. District Lodge No.
27 of International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers.70 Anaconda involved an employer’s action to overturn an arbi-
tral award ordering the reinstatement of an employee who had
been terminated without union representation during his discharge
meeting.71  The district court refused to vacate the arbitral award,
and the employer appealed.72  The Sixth Circuit affirmed explaining
that the arbitrator’s interpretation of federal law did not demon-
strate “a ‘manifest disregard of the law.’”73
The Eighth Circuit followed suit, recognizing manifest disre-
gard as a legitimate ground for vacating an arbitral award in Stroh
Container Co. v. Delphi Industries, Inc.74  In Stroh Container, the
defendant, a brewer, sought to overturn an arbitral award that
65. Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1969).
66. Id. at 1129.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1128 (citations omitted).
70. Anaconda Co. v. Dist. Lodge No. 27 of Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 693 F.2d
35 (6th Cir. 1982).
71. Id. at 36.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 37–38.
74. Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Inds., Inc., 783 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986).
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found the brewer in breach of both a wholesaler franchise agree-
ment and the duty of good faith and fair dealing.75  The district
court confirmed the award and the brewer appealed.76  Addressing
the standard of review, the Eighth Circuit explained that “an arbi-
trator’s conclusions on substantive matters may be vacated only
when the award demonstrates a manifest disregard of the law where
the arbitrators correctly state the law and then proceed to disregard
it.”77  Having found no indication that the arbitrators “expressly
flouted the law in reaching their decision or otherwise acted irra-
tionally,” the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order.78
A month after Stroh Container, the Ninth Circuit applied the
manifest disregard standard to reverse a district court’s decision to
strike an arbitral award of consequential damages.79  The arbitral
panel in French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.80
found Merrill Lynch liable to James French, a market maker on the
options floor of the Pacific Stock Exchange (PSE), for negligent
misrepresentation in connection with the sale of option contracts.
Merrill Lynch argued that by awarding consequential damages, the
arbitration panel exceeded its scope of authority as defined by the
parties’ agreement.81  After finding that the agreement incorpo-
rated the PSE Rules, which in turn allowed for the consequential
damages award, the court addressed the award itself and found that
it “was neither ‘completely irrational’ nor a ‘manifest disregard of
the law.’”82  The Ninth Circuit therefore reinstated the panel’s con-
sequential damages award.83
The decade closed with the Tenth Circuit addressing the mani-
fest disregard standard in Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Securities,
Inc.84 Jenkins involved a suit brought by two former stock brokers
seeking to overturn an arbitration panel’s decision that allowed
their former employer to recover funds that had been loaned to the
plaintiffs prior to their voluntary termination.85  The district court
upheld the award and the plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the arbi-
75. Id. at 745–46.
76. Id. at 747–48.
77. Id. at 749.
78. Id.
79. See French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902
(9th Cir. 1986).
80. French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902 (9th
Cir. 1986).
81. Id. at 908.
82. Id. at 909.
83. Id.
84. Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988).
85. Id. at 632–33.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-1\DIK104.txt unknown Seq: 13 19-OCT-18 14:27
2018] THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF MANIFEST DISREGARD 179
tration record contained no evidence that could rationally support
the award and that the panel’s decision should therefore be over-
turned under a “fundamental irrationality” standard implied in sec-
tion 10 of the FAA.86  After discussing the FAA’s enumerated
grounds for vacatur, the Tenth Circuit somewhat shockingly stated:
[F]ederal courts have never limited their scope of review to a
strict reading of this statute.  Viewed either as an inherent appur-
tenance to the right of judicial review or as a broad interpretation
of subsection (d) prohibiting arbitrators from exceeding their
powers, the arbitration award has traditionally been subjected to
a sort of “abuse of discretion” standard.87
The court then discussed the manifest disregard analysis, ex-
plaining that while courts have applied the standard to situations of
willful inattentiveness to the governing law, “several other terms of
art have been employed to ensure that the arbitrator’s decision re-
lies on his interpretation of the contract as contrasted with his own
beliefs of fairness and justice.”88  Applying this standard, the court
found that the language in the employment agreement was open to
more than just the plaintiffs’ interpretation and that the panel did




Perhaps encouraged by Justice Blackmun’s dissenting remark
that “[j]udicial review is still substantially limited to the four
grounds listed in § 10 of the Arbitration Act and to the concept of
‘manifest disregard’ of the law,”90 the remaining circuit courts
adopted the manifest disregard standard by the end of the 20th
century.
86. Id. at 633.
87. Id. at 633–34 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 634.
89. Id. at 635.
90. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 259 (1987) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting in part).  In fact, Justice Blackmun’s statement was relied on as
“Supreme Court authority for the proposition that in federal court an award may
be vacated if it is made in manifest disregard of the law.”  Countrywide Fin. Corp.
v. Bundy, 187 Cal. App. 4th 234, 250 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Shearson/Am. Ex-
press Inc., 482 U.S. at 259); see also Jenkins, 847 F.2d at 631 (quoting Justice Black-
mun’s statement in Shearson/American Express, Inc. and explaining that the
manifest disregard standard remained valid).
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The First Circuit embraced the standard in Advest, Inc. v. Mc-
Carthy.91  The appellant in McCarthy, a brokerage house, filed a
motion to vacate an arbitral award that ordered the restoration of
shares of an investor’s stock that had been wrongfully liquidated.92
In affirming the district court’s denial of the motion, the First Cir-
cuit explained that although the FAA does not permit courts “to
roam unbridled in their oversight of arbitral awards,” courts still
“retain a very limited power to review arbitration awards outside
section 10.”93  The court then turned to the appellant’s argument
that the panel incorrectly calculated the measure of damages and
explained that “in order to prevail, [the appellant] . . . must prove
that the arbitrator’s choice of redress was in manifest disregard of
the law.”94  Having found that the “narrowly tailored compensatory
remedy was well within the arbitrators’ discretion,” the court af-
firmed the district court’s denial of the appellant’s motion.95
Both the Fourth and D.C. Circuits subsequently adopted the
manifest disregard standard in cases involving labor arbitral awards.
In Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, District
31,96 the Fourth Circuit reviewed a district court’s decision to vacate
an award requiring the plaintiff, a coal company, to continue pro-
viding health benefits to laid-off employees after the expiration of
their collective bargaining agreement.97  The district court held that
the arbitrators exceeded the scope of their authority by issuing an
award that contradicted an earlier Fourth Circuit decision.98  The
Fourth Circuit began by discussing the “special degree of defer-
ence” given to an arbitral award, explaining that the “legal interpre-
tation of an arbitrator may only be overturned where it is in
manifest disregard of the law.”99  Such instances occur, the court
explained, when “arbitrators understand and correctly state the law,
but proceed to disregard the same.”100  The court then set forth
three plausible readings of the collective bargaining agreement
under which the arbitrators could have issued their award without
91. Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1990).
92. Id. at 7–8.
93. Id. at 8.
94. Id. at 10.
95. Id. at 11.
96. Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 31, 933 F.2d
225 (4th Cir. 1991).
97. Id. at 227.
98. Id. at 228–29.
99. Id. at 229.
100. Id. (quoting San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay
Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961)).
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running afoul of the court’s earlier decision.101  Accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, finding the ar-
bitrators justified in reaching their conclusion.102
Soon thereafter, the D.C. Circuit applied the manifest disre-
gard standard in affirming a district court’s confirmation of an arbi-
tral award arising from a breach of contract claim.103  The plaintiff
in Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc.104 sold his business to the
defendant for a price that would be determined based on the com-
pany’s earnings over five years.105  A dispute over the company’s
profitability soon arose, causing the seller to file an action alleging
fraud and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.106  The purchaser successfully moved to compel arbitration
pursuant to their agreement, and a panel of three arbitrators
awarded the plaintiff more than $38 million in damages.107  The dis-
trict court denied the defendant’s motion to vacate or modify the
award, and the defendant appealed arguing, in part, that the panel
disregarded the applicable law.108  In affirming the district court’s
judgment, the D.C. Circuit explained that the manifest disregard
standard “means much more than failure to apply the correct
law.”109   The court further stated that the standard “may be found,
for example, if the panel understood and correctly stated the law
but then proceeded to ignore it.”110  Here, the court explained, the
panel never mentioned the Ohio law on calculating lost profit pro-
jections, “and it certainly did not proceed either explicitly or implic-
itly to ignore that law.”111  The court thus found that “the panel did
not manifestly disregard the law,” and it was therefore unnecessary
to disturb the panel’s award.112
The Seventh Circuit applied the manifest disregard standard in
Health Services Management Corp. v. Hughes,113 a case concerning
a payment dispute for work performed pursuant to an architectural
contract.  An arbitration panel awarded the architect $11,427, and
101. Id. at 229–30.
102. Id. at 230.
103. Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
104. Id. at 1176–78.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1177.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1177–78.




113. Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1992).
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the district court confirmed the award.114  On appeal, the property
owner argued that the arbitrators had acted in manifest disregard of
the law by awarding the architect damages based on quantum me-
ruit even though the claim itself arose from a contract dispute.115
The Seventh Circuit explained that in order to vacate an arbitration
award for manifest disregard of the law, the arbitrators must have
“deliberately disregarded what they knew to be the law in order to
reach the result they did.”116  Finding no evidence in the record met
this standard, the court affirmed the district court’s confirmation of
the award.117
b. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan
With 12 circuit courts having adopted the manifest disregard
standard, it was only fitting that the Supreme Court soon found it-
self again addressing this issue in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan.118
First Options involved a dispute between First Options of Chi-
cago—a firm that cleared trades on the Philadelphia Stock Ex-
change—and Manuel Kaplan, his wife, and their wholly owned
investment company, MKI, whose trading account First Options
cleared.119  After MKI lost over $1.5 million, First Options took
control of the company and demanded that the Kaplans repay any
remaining deficiency.120  When those demands went unanswered,
First Options brought an arbitration action against both MKI and
the Kaplans before a panel of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange.121
The Kaplans argued that arbitration was improper because only
MKI and First Options had signed the document containing the ar-
bitration clause; the Kaplans did not.122  The arbitrators disagreed,
and the district court confirmed the award.123  The Kaplans ap-
pealed to the Third Circuit which reversed the confirmation, agree-
ing with the Kaplans that the matter was not arbitrable.124  The
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari on the issue of
114. Id. at 1256.
115. Id. at 1257.
116. Id. at 1267.
117. Id.
118. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
119. Id. at 940.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 941.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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“who—court or arbitrator—has the primary authority to decide
whether a party has agreed to arbitrate.”125
The Court began its short decision by explaining the practical
importance of the issue:  because judicial review of arbitral awards
is so narrow, arbitration decisions would be nearly invulnerable if
arbitrators had the ability to determine their own authority.126  In
support of this reasoning, the Court detailed the limited scope of
arbitral review, citing first to the four grounds for vacatur listed in
section 10 of the FAA and then to Wilko, stating that “parties [are]
bound by [an] arbitrator’s decision not in ‘manifest disregard’ of the
law.”127  In so doing, the Court once again signaled its approval of
manifest disregard as an accepted standard for judicial review.
The impact of First Options would be felt almost immediately.
Having now seen that the reference to manifest disregard in Wilko
was not mere dicta,128 the two remaining hold-outs, the Eleventh
and Fifth Circuits, both went on to apply this non-statutory stan-
dard to review the propriety of arbitral awards.
c. Post-First Options
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the manifest disregard standard
when it reversed a district court’s affirmation of an arbitration
award in Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc.129 Montes in-
volved an arbitration claim brought by an employee seeking over-
time pay pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)130 from
her former employer.131  The employee alleged that the arbitration
board, at the urging of the employer, had issued her employer a
favorable award in contravention of FLSA.132  The Eleventh Circuit
began its opinion by explaining that in the past it had “not found it
necessary to expressly adopt [the manifest disregard standard], as it
was unnecessary for the resolution of the cases in which it was dis-
cussed.”133  However, the court explained, the Supreme Court’s rul-
ing in First Options made it clear that such a standard did in fact
exist and “constitute[d] grounds to vacate an arbitration decision”
125. Id. at 942.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., 4 FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 40.7.1, at
40:43 (Supp. 1999) (“[First Options gives] the Supreme Court’s seal of approval to
[the] manifest disregard doctrine . . . .”).
129. Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2018).
131. Montes, 128 F.3d at 1458.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1460.
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where the panel “was flagrantly and blatantly urged” to ignore the
law.134  The court therefore reversed the district court’s decision
and remanded the case with instructions to refer the matter to a
new arbitration panel.135
In issuing its decision, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out that
“every other circuit except the Fifth . . . has expressly recognized
that ‘manifest disregard of the law’ is an appropriate reason to re-
view and vacate an arbitration panel’s decision.”136  This statement
remained true for another two years, at which point the Fifth Cir-
cuit finally ended its holdout in Williams v. Cigna Financial Advi-
sors Inc.137
Williams concerned an arbitration award that denied the plain-
tiff’s age discrimination and retaliation claims against his former
employer.138  The district court confirmed the award, and the plain-
tiff appealed claiming the panel acted contrary to the applicable law
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.139
The Fifth Circuit began its opinion by explaining that it had
twice declined to recognize the manifest disregard standard.140
Moreover, the court acknowledged that it had previously stated in
dicta that judicial review of commercial arbitration awards is lim-
ited to instances specifically outlined in section 10 of the FAA.141
However, “clear approval of the ‘manifest disregard’ of the law
standard in the review of arbitration awards under the FAA was
signaled by the Supreme Court’s statement in First Options that
‘parties [are] bound by [an] arbitrator’s decision not in ‘manifest
disregard’ of the law.’”142  Turning to the case before it, the court
found that “it is not manifest” from the arbitration’s transcripts
“that the arbitrators acted contrary to the applicable law in re-
134. Id. at 1460–62.  The court explained:
We apply it here because we are able to clearly discern from the record
that this is one of those cases where manifest disregard of the law is appli-
cable, as the arbitrators recognized that they were told to disregard the
law (which the record reflects they knew) in a case in which the evidence
to support the award was marginal.  Thus, there is nothing in the record
to refute the suggestion that the law was disregarded.  Nor does the re-
cord clearly support the award.
Id. at 1462.
135. Id. at 1464.
136. Id. at 1460.
137. Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 1999).
138. Id. at 757.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 758.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 759 (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942
(1995)).
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jecting [the plaintiff’s] claims.”143  Therefore, the court affirmed the
district court’s affirmation of the arbitrators’ award.144
II. HALL STREET AND THE ENSUING CIRCUIT SPLIT
Although every circuit court had adopted the manifest disre-
gard standard by the end of the 20th century, many commentators
still questioned the practicality of this common law method of arbi-
tral review.  As one author lamented, “manifest disregard has be-
come a repository for all sorts of outlandish theories of arbitral
misconduct, devised with but one aim in mind:  the application of
standards of appellate review to the arbitration process, and ulti-
mately, to vacatur of a particular arbitral award.”145  In fact, as was
soon demonstrated by Judge Frank Easterbrook, academics were
not alone in these reservations.
A. Watts: A Forerunner to Circuit Discord
Only two years after the Williams decision cemented consensus
on the manifest disregard standard’s viability, the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co.146 challenged
the new-found harmony.
Watts involved a dispute between Tiffany & Co., a luxury jew-
elry and specialty retailer, and a store that sold its merchandise.147
Although the parties did not have a pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ment, they nevertheless agreed to have an arbitrator hear the dis-
pute as opposed to litigating the matter.148  After the hearing, the
arbitrator issued an award in favor of the store owner but did not
agree that Tiffany & Co. should pay the owner’s attorney’s fees and
costs.149  Believing that this decision violated Wisconsin law,150
Watts asked the district court to provide more relief than the arbi-
trator had awarded.151  After the district court upheld the award,
Watts appealed arguing that the arbitrator’s decision departed from
state law.152
143. Id. at 762.
144. Id. at 765.
145. Marta Varela, Arbitration and the Doctrine of Manifest Disregard, 49
DISP. RESOL. J. 64, 65 (1994).
146. George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
147. Id. at 578.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. The Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law awards successful plaintiffs damages
and costs of the action, including attorney fees. See WIS. STAT. § 135.06 (2018).
151. George Watts & Son, Inc., 248 F.3d at 578.
152. Id.
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Interestingly, rather than simply applying the manifest disre-
gard standard to the facts of the case, the Seventh Circuit instead
questioned the exact meaning of the standard.  As Judge Easter-
brook explained:
What could it mean to say that an arbitrator manifestly disre-
garded the law?  That the arbitrator made a legal error?  This is
Watts’ view—that Wisconsin law entitles the prevailing party to
attorneys’ fees in every case under the [Wisconsin Fair Dealer-
ship Law], that it “prevailed” in the arbitration by obtaining an
extension of its dealership plus exceptionally favorable terms for
the repurchase of inventory, and that the law therefore required
the arbitrator to award legal fees too.  If “manifest disregard”
means only a legal error, however, then arbitration cannot be fi-
nal.  Every arbitration could be followed by a suit, seeking review
of legal errors, serving the same function as an appeal within a
unitary judicial system.  That would prevent the parties from
achieving the principal objectives of arbitration: swift, inexpen-
sive, and conclusive resolution of disputes.  If “manifest disre-
gard” means not just any legal error but rather a “clear” error
(one about which there is, in Watts’ language, “no reasonable de-
bate”), again arbitration could not be final, and the post-arbitra-
tion litigation would be even more complex than a search for
simple error-for how blatant a legal mistake must be to count as
“clear” or “manifest” error lacks any straightforward answer.153
The court turned its attention to a Supreme Court decision
from the previous year in which the Court had explained that “the
judiciary may step in when the arbitrator has commanded the par-
ties to violate legal norms.”154  The Seventh Circuit believed that
the Court’s guidance helped clarify the standard’s application to sit-
uations in which an arbitrator issued an order that requires parties
to violate the law or does “not adhere to the legal principles speci-
fied by contract, and [is] hence unenforceable under § 10(a)(4) [of
the FAA].”155  With this understanding, the court explained that if
the parties wanted to prevent the arbitrator from issuing an award
that required each party to bear its own legal expenses, they could
have set forth that limitation in their arbitration agreement.156  Had
the parties agreed to such a limitation, the arbitrator’s decision
would have been reviewable under section 10(a)(4) of the FAA.157
153. Id. at 579.
154. Id. at 580 (citing E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of
Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 63 (2000)).
155. Id. at 581.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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But the agreement at issue did not contain such a provision.  Thus,
the court concluded, “the arbitrator has considerable leeway so
long as he respects the limits the parties’ contract and public law
place on his discretion.”158  The Seventh Circuit therefore upheld
the district court’s confirmation of the award and simultaneously
adopted an extremely narrow interpretation of the manifest disre-
gard standard.159
Notwithstanding the Seventh Circuit’s narrow view,160 the re-
maining circuit courts continued to allow parties to assert claims of
manifest disregard of the law,161 thereby generating a near decade
of judicial uniformity.  Therefore, it came as somewhat of a surprise
when the Supreme Court revisited the manifest disregard standard
in 2008 in Hall Street162—a dispute that Justice Stephen Breyer
would refer to as the “case of the century.”163
B. Hall Street
Hall Street involved a dispute over an indemnification provi-
sion in an agreement between a landlord—Hall Street Associates,
L.L.C.—and its tenant—Mattel, Inc.164  Rather than litigating the
dispute, the parties drafted a post-dispute arbitration agreement
that contained a provision that allowed a district court to vacate the
award “(i) where the arbitrator’s findings of facts are not supported
by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator’s conclusions of
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. The Seventh Circuit would later explain that it had “defined ‘manifest
disregard of the law’ so narrowly that it fits comfortably under the first clause of
the fourth statutory ground.”  Wise v. Wachovia Sec., L.L.C., 450 F.3d 265, 268
(7th Cir. 2006).
161. See, e.g., Three S. Del., Inc. v. DataQuick Info. Sys., Inc., 492 F.3d 520,
527 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The permissible common law grounds for vacating such an
award include those circumstances where an award fails to draw its essence from
the contract, or the award evidences a manifest disregard of the law.”) (internal
citation omitted); B.L. Harbert Int’l, L.L.C. v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905,
910 (11th Cir. 2006) (“This Court first adopted manifest disregard for the law as a
basis for challenging an arbitration award . . . .”); Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v.
Echostar Satellite L.L.C., 430 F.3d 1269, 1275 (10th Cir. 2005) (“In addition, we
have acknowledged a judicially-created basis for vacating an award when the arbi-
trators acted in ‘manifest disregard’ of the law.”); Brabham v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons Inc., 376 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2004) (“We agree with the district court that
manifest disregard is an accepted nonstatutory ground for vacatur and that the
arbitrators in this case did not manifestly disregard the law.”).
162. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
163. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel,
Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (No. 06-989).
164. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 579.
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law are erroneous.”165  After the hearing, the arbitrator issued an
award in favor of Hall Street and both parties sought modifica-
tion.166  The district court applied the standard of review for legal
error stipulated in the parties’ arbitration agreement and modified
the arbitrator’s calculation of interest.167  The Ninth Circuit re-
versed, explaining that because the FAA did not prescribe the stan-
dard of review that the district court applied, “the terms of the
arbitration agreement controlling the mode of judicial review are
unenforceable and severable.”168  The Supreme Court was subse-
quently presented with the question of whether parties to an arbi-
tration agreement may expand the grounds for vacatur and
modification beyond those set forth in sections 10 and 11 of the
FAA.169
Hall Street argued that just as the Court in Wilko had created
an extra-statutory ground for vacatur through the manifest disre-
gard standard, so too should parties be permitted to contractually
expand the grounds to vacate or modify an award.170  The Court,
turning to the language of section 9 of the FAA,171 explained that
“[t]here is nothing malleable about ‘must grant,’ which unequivo-
cally tells courts to grant confirmation in all cases, except when one
of the ‘prescribed’ exceptions applies.”172  The Court thus rejected
Hall Street’s argument, and announced that “the statutory grounds
are exclusive.”173  As to Wilko’s use of the phrase “manifest disre-
gard,” the Court set forth several possible justifications for the
standard:
165. Id.
166. Id. at 580.  Although the arbitration was first decided in favor of Mattel,
the district court vacated the award after finding that the arbitrator’s failure to
treat the Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act as an applicable law under the terms
of the lease was “legal error,” a standard of review that the parties had included in
the arbitration agreement. Id. at 580.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 581.
169. Id. at 578 (“The question here is whether statutory grounds for prompt
vacatur and modification may be supplemented by contract.”).
170. Id. at 584–85 (“[I]f judges can add grounds to vacate (or modify), so can
contracting parties.”).
171. 9 U.S.C. § 9 determines when an award is subject to judicial
confirmation.
172. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 587.
173. Id. at 578.  However, in holding that parties may not contractually ex-
pand judicial review, the Court allowed the review of an arbitration award under
state law alternatives to the FAA, stating, “we do not purport to say that they
exclude more searching review based on authority outside the statute as well.” Id.
at 590.  Accordingly, enforcement of arbitration awards may be sought under state
statutory or common law. Id.
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Maybe the term “manifest disregard” was meant to name a new
ground for review, but maybe it merely referred to the § 10
grounds collectively, rather than adding to them. Or, as some
courts have thought, “manifest disregard” may have been short-
hand for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4), the paragraphs authorizing va-
catur when the arbitrators were “guilty of misconduct” or
“exceeded their powers.”  We, when speaking as a Court, have
merely taken the Wilko language as we found it, without embel-
lishment, and now that its meaning is implicated, we see no rea-
son to accord it the significance that Hall Street urges.174
Commentators immediately noted that while Hall Street pro-
hibited parties from contracting to expand judicial review,175 it was
unclear whether the Court eliminated review for manifest disregard
by holding that the statutory grounds for vacatur were “exclu-
sive.”176  Not surprisingly, a circuit split has since developed over
the issue, with some circuit courts still applying the standard, some
holding that the standard is no longer valid, some explicitly refusing
to address the issue, and one circuit issuing two contradictory hold-
ings regarding the standard’s viability.
1. Circuits that Still Apply Manifest Disregard
Just eight months after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hall
Street, the Second Circuit applied the manifest disregard standard in
deciding whether a district court correctly vacated an award due to
an arbitral panel’s decision to permit class arbitration when the
174. Id. at 585.
175. This restriction led one scholar to lament that “one may still be troubled
by the rigidity of an arbitration regime that says to sophisticated commercial par-
ties that if they want arbitration they may have it, but only according to one partic-
ular formula.”  John J. Barcelo´, Expanded Judicial Review of Awards After Hall
Street and in Comparative Perspective, in  RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
1, 6 (Peter Hay et al. eds., 2009).
176. See, e.g., The Viability of Manifest Disregard Challenges After Hall Street,
INT’L DISP. RESOL. (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, New York,
N.Y.), Oct. 2008, at 1, http://bit.ly/2pbNf8E (“Since the U.S. Supreme Court issued
its decision in [Hall Street] six months ago, the ability of parties to challenge
awards governed by the [FAA] on the ground that the arbitrators manifestly disre-
garded the law has been in question.”); Ileana Blanco & Andrew F. Spalding, “The
Case of the Century”: U.S. Supreme Court Decides (Almost) the Extent of Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards, MONDAQ (Mar. 27, 2008), http://bit.ly/2QwnXOR
(“While making clear that judicial review under the FAA was limited under the
statute, the Court’s following conclusion indicate that this issue is far from settled
. . . .”); Sarah Cole, Hall Street Decision Today: Parties Cannot Expand Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards, INDISPUTABLY (Mar. 25, 2008), http://
www.indisputably.org/?p=92 (“[T]he Court’s treatment of the manifest disregard
standard was unconvincing. . . . What is [its] fate following Hall Street?”).
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agreement had not explicitly prohibited it.177  The plaintiff in Stolt-
Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds International, Corp.178 shipped goods
using the defendant’s tankers pursuant to a standard form contract
that contained a broad arbitration clause.179  After learning that the
Justice Department had alleged that the defendants engaged in ille-
gal price-fixing, the plaintiff sought to bring an action against Stolt-
Nielsen on behalf of class customers and competitors.180 Stolt-Niel-
sen countered that the arbitration clause’s silence on class arbitra-
tion required all arbitral disputes to be brought individually.181  The
arbitration panel disagreed concluding that the agreement did in-
deed permit class arbitration.182  Stolt-Nielsen petitioned the dis-
trict court to vacate the award and the court acquiesced, holding
that the arbitrators acted in manifest disregard of the law by
“fail[ing] to make any meaningful choice-of-law analysis” regarding
the applicability of federal maritime law.183  The plaintiff appealed,
presenting the Second Circuit with the question of what effect, if
any, Hall Street had on “the scope or vitality of the ‘manifest disre-
gard’ doctrine.”184
The Second Circuit began its opinion by explaining:
In the short time since Hall Street was decided, courts have begun
to grapple with its implications for the “manifest disregard” doc-
trine.  Some have concluded or suggested that the doctrine sim-
ply does not survive.  Others think that “manifest disregard,”
reconceptualized as a judicial gloss on the specific grounds for
vacatur enumerated in section 10 of the FAA, remains a valid
ground for vacating arbitration awards.  We agree with those
courts that take the latter approach.185
Having found that the standard survived the Hall Street deci-
sion, the court turned to whether the arbitrator manifestly disre-
garded the law by “ignoring” federal maritime law in permitting
class arbitration.186  The court noted that Stolt-Nielsen failed to cite
177. See Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir.
2008).
178. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008).
179. Id. at 87–89.
180. Id. at 87; see also Reply Brief for Respondent-Appellant at 1 n.1, Stolt-
Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3474-
cv).
181. Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 89.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 90.
184. Id. at 93.
185. Id. at 94 (citations omitted).
186. Id. at 96.
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any decisions holding that a federal maritime rule of construction
precluded class arbitration when the arbitration clause was silent on
the matter.187  The court thus concluded that the dispute before it
was really one of contract interpretation.188  The court then noted
that it had previously “held that ‘the misapplication . . . of . . . rules
of contract interpretation does not rise to the stature of a ‘manifest
disregard’ of law.’”189   Therefore, the arbitration panel’s decision
to interpret the contract language as permitting class arbitration
was not an error warranting vacatur.190
The following year, the Ninth Circuit applied the manifest dis-
regard standard when it held that a district court should have va-
cated an arbitrator’s grant of injunctive relief. Comedy Club, Inc. v.
Improv West Associates191 involved a trademark license agreement
that granted Comedy Club an exclusive license to use Improv
West’s trademarks but prohibited Comedy Club from opening any
non-Improv clubs during the agreement’s term.192  Comedy Club
soon defaulted on the agreement, and Improv West notified Com-
edy Club that they would be withdrawing Comedy Club’s license
and right to open more Improv clubs.193   In response, Comedy
Club sought declaratory relief that the clause prohibiting Comedy
Club from opening any non-Improv clubs was void under Califor-
nia’s statutory prohibition on noncompetition agreements.194  The
dispute was ordered to arbitration, and the arbitrator found that the
restrictive covenant was “a valid and enforceable in-term covenant
not to compete” which remained valid through the remaining term
of the agreement.195
The district court affirmed the arbitrator’s decision and Com-
edy Club appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the arbitrator’s
enforcement of the covenant, despite California’s statutory prohibi-
tions, constituted a “manifest disregard of the law.”196  In response,
Improv West argued that manifest disregard of the law no longer
constituted a valid ground for vacatur post-Hall Street.197  The
Ninth Circuit, however, explained that it had previously held that
187. Id. at 101.
188. Id. at 98.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 101–02.
191. Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009).
192. Id. at 1281.
193. Id. at 1282.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1282–83.
196. Id. at 1283.
197. Id. at 1289–90.
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“the manifest disregard ground for vacatur is shorthand for a statu-
tory ground under” section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, which allows a
court to vacate an award “where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers.”198  The court therefore concluded that “manifest disregard
of the law remains a valid ground for vacatur” post-Hall Street.199
After determining that the manifest disregard standard was the
correct standard of review, the Ninth Circuit turned to the arbitra-
tor’s ruling.200  The court explained that by holding the clause en-
forceable, the arbitrator “ignore[d] . . . [California law] and thus
[was] in manifest disregard of the law.”201  The court therefore or-
dered the district court to vacate the arbitrator’s injunctive relief as
to any county where Comedy Club was not operating an Improv
club.202
The Fourth Circuit was the last circuit to accept the manifest
disregard standard when it vacated an arbitral award in Dewan v.
Walia.203  The appellant in Dewan filed an arbitration demand
claiming that the appellee, his former employee, breached the non-
compete and non-solicitation provisions in his employment agree-
ment;204 the appellee countered with a number of employment
claims of his own.205  The arbitrator issued an award in favor of the
appellee despite having found that the parties signed a valid release
clause that discharged the appellants from all employment
claims.206  The district court confirmed the award, and the employer
appealed to the Fourth Circuit arguing that the arbitrator acted in
manifest disregard of the law.207
The Fourth Circuit explained that although “[m]erely misinter-
preting contract language does not constitute a manifest disregard
of the law[,] [a]n arbitrator may not . . . disregard or modify unam-
biguous contract provisions.”208  The court then turned to the arbi-
trator’s conclusion that while the release extinguished the
appellee’s ability to bring his claims in state or federal court, it did
not extinguish his ability to bring such claims in an arbitral fo-
rum.209  The court rejected this logic as supported by “neither lin-
198. Id. at 1290 (citation omitted).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1293.
201. Comedy Club, Inc., 553 F.3d at 1293.
202. Id.
203. Dewan v. Walia, 544 F. App’x 240 (4th Cir. 2013).
204. Id. at 241.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 242–43.
207. Id. at 244–45.
208. Id. at 246 (citations omitted).
209. Id. at 247.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-1\DIK104.txt unknown Seq: 27 19-OCT-18 14:27
2018] THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF MANIFEST DISREGARD 193
guistic gymnastics, nor a selective reading of Maryland contract
law” and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the
award.210
Even though these circuits agree that the manifest disregard
standard survived Hall Street, they disagree as to the current mean-
ing of that standard.  Each circuit maintains its own interpretation.
Two circuits view the standard as “judicial gloss” on the
grounds for vacatur enumerated in section 10 of the FAA.  In Stolt-
Nielsen, the Second Circuit opined that Hall Street stands for the
proposition that the FAA sets forth the “exclusive” grounds for va-
cating an arbitration award.211  However, the court observed, that
proposition did not render the standard invalid.  Instead, the Sec-
ond Circuit found that Hall Street’s remark—that “the term ‘mani-
fest disregard’ . . . merely referred to the § 10 grounds collectively,
rather than adding to them”212—confirmed that the ruling “did not
. . . abrogate the ‘manifest disregard’ doctrine altogether.”213  The
Second Circuit therefore deemed the standard “judicial gloss” on
the four standards for vacatur enumerated in the FAA.  The Ninth
Circuit similarly found in Comedy Club that the manifest disregard
standard serves as judicial “shorthand” for section 10(a)(4) of the
FAA.214
The Fourth Circuit in Dewan took a more expansive approach,
finding that the standard “continues to exist as a basis for vacating
an arbitration award, either as an independent ground for review or
as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth
in the FAA.”215
2. Circuits that Reject Manifest Disregard
While the three circuits mentioned above continue to apply the
manifest disregard standard, other appellate courts interpret Hall
Street differently, holding instead that the standard did not survive
the Supreme Court’s ruling.  The first of these decisions was Ci-
210. Id. at 248.
211. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir.
2008) (citation omitted).
212. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 587 (2008).
213. Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 94–95 (citation omitted).
214. Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir.
2009); see also id. at 1281 (“[I]n this circuit, an arbitrator’s manifest disregard of
the law remains a valid ground for vacatur of an arbitration award under § 10(a)(4)
of the Federal Arbitration Act.”).
215. Dewan, 544 F. App’x at 246 n.5 (quoting Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Brand,
671 F.3d 472, 483 (4th Cir. 2012)).
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tigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon,216 in which a district court
vacated an arbitral award on the grounds that the arbitration panel
acted in manifest disregard of the law when it failed to apply Texas
law.217  The Fifth Circuit discussed how it begrudgingly adopted the
manifest disregard standard after the Supreme Court’s ruling in
First Options.218  However, with the Court’s recent ruling in Hall
Street, the court found that the standard no longer remained via-
ble.219  As the court explained:
In the light of the Supreme Court’s clear language that, under the
FAA, the statutory provisions are the exclusive grounds for vaca-
tur, manifest disregard of the law as an independent, nonstatu-
tory ground for setting aside an award must be abandoned and
rejected.  Indeed, the term itself, as a term of legal art, is no
longer useful in actions to vacate arbitration awards. Hall Street
made it plain that the statutory language means what it says:
“courts must [confirm the award] unless the award is vacated,
modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this
title,” and there’s nothing malleable about “must.”  Thus, from
this point forward, arbitration awards under the FAA may be va-
cated only for reasons provided in § 10.220
Applying this interpretation of Hall Street, the Fifth Circuit va-
cated the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further
consideration as to whether the grounds asserted for vacating the
award might be supported under those enumerated in the FAA.221
In 2010, the Eleventh Circuit became the next circuit court to
question the availability of the manifest disregard standard post-
Hall Street in Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp.222 Frazier involved a
loan dispute in which the borrowers filed claims for breach of con-
tract, fraud, and misrepresentation against the assignee, alleging,
among other issues, that the bank misrepresented that the loan was
unsecured.223  The defendant compelled arbitration pursuant to a
clause in the loan agreement, and the arbitrator subsequently issued
an award in favor of the bank’s assignee.224  The district court con-
firmed the award, and the borrowers appealed, claiming in part that
216. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009).
217. Id. at 350.
218. Id. at 355.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 358 (emphasis and brackets in original) (first quoting 9 U.S.C. § 9;
and then quoting Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 587 (2008)).
221. Id.
222. Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010).
223. Id. at 1314–17.
224. Id. at 1318–19.
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the arbitrator’s decision was contrary to public policy and made in
manifest disregard of the law.225
The Eleventh Circuit began its opinion by explaining that al-
though it recognized the standard in previous decisions, the Su-
preme Court’s ruling in Hall Street “casts serious doubt on their
legitimacy.”226  After briefly discussing the Hall Street holding, the
court concluded that sections 10 and 11 of the FAA provide the
exclusive grounds for modifying or vacating an arbitral award.227
Having found the manifest disregard standard no longer valid, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the
award.228
Just three months after the Frazier decision, the Eighth Circuit
became the third circuit court to hold that Hall Street foreclosed
application of the manifest disregard standard to arbitral awards.
Medicine Shoppe International, Inc. v. Turner Investments, Inc.229
involved a franchisor’s arbitration claim alleging that the franchisee
violated the franchise agreement.230  The arbitration panel entered
an award in favor of the franchisor, and the district court con-
firmed.231  The franchisee appealed arguing that the panel acted in
manifest disregard of the law by failing to properly apply Missouri
law when it calculated future profits.232
Like the Eleventh Circuit in Frazier, the Eighth Circuit began
its opinion by discussing Hall Street’s effect on the status of the
manifest disregard standard.233  Remarkably, the Eighth Circuit ig-
nored the near decade prior to Hall Street during which the circuit
courts had been in agreement as to the viability of the standard.
Instead the court explained:  “In 2008 . . . Hall Street, resolving a
circuit split, held that ‘the text [of the FAA] compels a reading of
the §§ 10 and 11 categories as exclusive.’”234  Ironically, the court
appeared to identify a circuit split that never existed and uniformity
in the midst of disagreement.  Turning to the case before it, the
court noted that the franchisee had not alleged corruption, fraud,
partiality, or abuse of power—the four grounds recognized under
225. Id. at 1320–21.
226. Id. at 1322.
227. Id. at 1324.
228. Id.
229. Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc., 614 F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2010).
230. Id. at 487.
231. Id. at 487–88.
232. Id. at 488.
233. Id. at 488–89.
234. Id. at 489 (emphasis added) (quoting Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel,
Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008)).
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the FAA.235  Given that the franchisee had limited its argument to
the arbitrator’s alleged manifest disregard of the law, a standard the
Eighth Circuit no longer recognized, the court had no option but to
affirm the district court’s decision.236
Finally, the Seventh Circuit rejected the manifest disregard
standard in Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc.,237 which involved a lawsuit between former members of a
joint venture over ownership rights to several peptide compound
patents.238  The parties’ agreement, which included an arbitration
clause, stated that while the parties would jointly own any invention
created through the parties’ joint efforts, an invention attributable
to a single party would be owned solely by that party.239 A dispute
ultimately arose and the parties sought a declaration from an arbi-
tration panel identifying the owner of certain patents and patent
applications.240  The three-member panel issued an award stating
that while some of the patents were jointly owned, one family of
patents belonged solely to a single member of the joint venture.241
The district court confirmed the award in part, but vacated the
award concerning the patents that the panel had declared were
solely owned, explaining that the panel acted in manifest disregard
of the law by issuing the award without providing legal analysis.242
After discussing the limited grounds for overturning arbitral
awards under section 10 of the FAA, the Seventh Circuit’s Chief
Judge Easterbrook, citing Hall Street, explained that  “‘manifest
disregard of the law’ is not a ground on which a court may reject an
arbitrator’s award under the Federal Arbitration Act.”243  How-
ever, Judge Easterbrook noted, the standard may fall under section
10(a)(4) if it is used to overturn an award when the arbitrator disre-
garded its limited authority under the parties’ agreement.244  Ap-
plying this understanding of the manifest disregard standard, Judge
Easterbrook questioned why the district court believed that the ar-
bitrators’ omission constituted a violation of the FAA, especially
since “arbitrators are free to act summarily, unless the parties’ con-
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharms., Inc., 660 F.3d 281 (7th
Cir. 2011).





243. Id. at 285.
244. Id.
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tract requires an opinion.”245  Judge Easterbrook found that the
district court’s inference—that the lack of explicit reasoning sig-
naled that there “must have [been] an extra-contractual ground”—
was nothing more than “a logical error.”246  Finding the panel prop-
erly applied the joint-venture agreement, the Seventh Circuit re-
versed the district court’s decision and remanded the case with
instructions to confirm the award.247
3. Circuits that Refuse to Address the Status of Manifest
Disregard
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street seemed to present
the lower courts with two options:  interpret the holding to either
limit vacatur to the four grounds listed in section 10 of the FAA or
leave the manifest disregard standard untouched.  Although each of
the seven circuit courts discussed above took one of those two
paths, a third option soon developed as four circuit courts chose to
avoid addressing the issue altogether.248
The Tenth Circuit was presented with the choice of how to in-
terpret Hall Street in DMA International, Inc. v. Qwest Communica-
tions International, Inc.249 DMA International involved a payment
dispute that centered on the interpretation of an ambiguous fee
provision in a service contract.250  The arbitrator deemed the clause
unclear and turned to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’
intent.251  Having reviewed the pertinent material, the arbitrator
found that no provision in the contract had been breached.252  The
245. Id.
246. Id. (“Silence is just silence.”).
247. Affymax, Inc., 660 F.3d at 286.  As the court explained:
[T]he question for decision by a federal court asked to set aside an arbi-
tration award . . . is not whether the arbitrator or arbitrators erred in
interpreting the contract; it is not whether they clearly erred in interpret-
ing the contract; it is not whether they grossly erred in interpreting the
contract; it is whether they interpreted the contract.
Id.
248. The Fourth Circuit had also originally refrained from deciding the effects
of Hall Street. See Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Bishop, 596 F.3d 183, 193
n.13 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding it “unnecessary to consider the effect of Hall Street.”).
However, that circuit would later apply the manifest disregard standard in its post-
Hall Street decision. See Dewan v. Walia, 544 F. App’x 240, 246 (2013); see also
supra Part II.B.1.
249. DMA Int’l, Inc. v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 585 F.3d 1341 (10th Cir.
2009).
250. Id. at 1343–44.
251. Id. at 1345.
252. Id.
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district court, applying the highly deferential standard of review for
arbitral awards, upheld the award.253
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit was presented with the issue of
whether the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law in issu-
ing its decision.254  Although the court held that the arbitrator cor-
rectly stated the Colorado law governing contract interpretation,255
it found it unnecessary to address whether the manifest disregard
standard survived Hall Street.  The court explained:
Qwest contends that this argument is foreclosed by Hall Street
Associates v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), in which the Su-
preme Court held that 9 U.S.C. § 10 provides the exclusive
grounds for expedited vacatur of an arbitration award.  Whether
manifest disregard for the law remains a valid ground for vacatur
is an interesting issue, but as the district court noted, one not
central to the resolution of this case.  As described below, the
arbitrator did not act with manifest disregard of the law or in any
other way that would justify vacatur.256
The Tenth Circuit therefore found it unnecessary to rule on the
status of the manifest disregard standard, and it has since continu-
ally refrained from doing so.257
The Third Circuit was next to avoid deciding the manifest dis-
regard standard in in Bapu Corp. v. Choice Hotels International,
Inc.258  The plaintiffs in Bapu Corp. entered into a franchise agree-
ment with Choice Hotels allowing them to open and operate a hotel
under the Quality Inn name.259  The agreement, which included an
arbitration clause, required the plaintiffs to renovate the building
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1344.
255. Id. at 1345.
256. Id. at 1344 n.2.
257. See, e.g., Legacy Trading Co. v. Hoffman, 363 F. App’x 633, 635 n.2 (10th
Cir. 2013) (“But we need not decide what, if any, judicially-created grounds for
vacatur survive in the wake of [Hall Street], because neither Legacy Trading nor
Mr. Uselton has established the right to vacatur under any judicially-created ex-
ceptions.”); Abbott v. Law Office of Patrick J. Mulligan, 440 F. App’x 612, 620
(10th Cir. 2011) (“[I]n the absence of firm guidance from the Supreme Court, we
decline to decide whether the manifest disregard standard should be entirely jet-
tisoned.”); Hicks v. Cadle Co., 355 F. App’x 186, 197 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We need
not decide whether § 10 provides the exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitrator’s
decision, because defendants demonstrate neither manifest disregard of the law
nor violation of public policy.”).  Moreover, although one Tenth Circuit decision
lists manifest disregard as one of several “judicially-created bases for vacating an
award,” that decision “is not binding precedent.”  Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Whitney, 419 F. App’x 826, 828 n.*, 833 (10th Cir. 2011).
258. Bapu Corp. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 371 F. App’x 306 (3d Cir. 2010).
259. Id. at 307.
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by November 20, 2000.260  Not only did the plaintiffs fail to meet
that deadline, but they also failed to respond to two separate offers
to extend the time frame in which the work had to be completed.261
Finally, four years after the original deadline for renovations
passed, Choice Hotels terminated the franchise agreement and
sought damages through arbitration.262  The plaintiffs objected to
the arbitration and declined to participate, arguing the claims were
barred by the applicable statute of limitations under both the
franchise agreement and Maryland law.263  The arbitrator subse-
quently issued an award in favor of Choice Hotels, and the district
court confirmed.264
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing in part that the arbitrator ac-
ted in manifest disregard of the law when it allowed Choice Hotels
to bring its claim six years after the original breach when the claim
was barred by the three-year limitations period.265  In response,
Choice Hotels argued that an arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the
law no longer serves as an independent basis for vacating an arbi-
tral award post-Hall Street.266  The Third Circuit disagreed, explain-
ing that although the Court in Hall Street held that the grounds for
vacatur listed in section 10 of the FAA are exclusive, “[i]t did not
. . . expressly decide whether the judicially created doctrine al-
lowing vacatur of an arbitration award for manifest disregard of the
law by an arbitrator would continue to exist as an independent basis
for vacatur.”267
Yet, although a circuit split had developed on the issue, the
Third Circuit saw “no need to decide the issue [since] this case does
not present one of those ‘exceedingly narrow’ circumstances sup-
porting a vacatur based on manifest disregard of the law.”268  The
court explained that the arbitrator made clear to the plaintiffs that
they could raise the arbitrability269 issue again once the record was





264. Id. at 307–08.
265. Id. at 308–09.
266. Id. at 309.
267. Id.
268. Bapu Corp., 371 F. App’x at 309.
269. The Supreme Court explained in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communi-
cations Workers of America that “[u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably
provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitration is to
be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.”  475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
270. Bapu Corp., 371 F. App’x at 309.
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their ability to raise the issue later.271  Moreover, the franchise
agreement itself stated that the parties agreed to submit the ques-
tion of arbitrability to the arbitrator.272  The court thus affirmed the
district court’s confirmation of the award.273
The D.C. Circuit soon joined the Third and Tenth Circuits in
avoiding the Hall Street issue altogether.  The case, Affinity Finan-
cial Corp. v. AARP Financial, Inc.,274 involved a dispute that arose
from a contract in which the petitioner agreed to provide financial
services to members of the appellee’s organization.275  When the
arbitral panel unanimously found in favor of the petitioner, the ap-
pellee moved to have the award vacated, arguing that the arbitra-
tors acted in manifest disregard of the law.276  Turning to the Hall
Street decision, the district court explained that although it ap-
peared that the manifest disregard standard had survived Hall
Street, “the court need not decide once and for all the viability of
the . . . standard in order to resolve this case”277 because the peti-
tioner could not point to examples where the arbitrator refused or
ignored legal principles.278
Similar to the district court’s decision, the D.C. Circuit ex-
plained that it was “[a]ssuming without deciding that the ‘manifest
disregard of the law’ standard still exists after” Hall Street; however,
the petitioner had not demonstrated that the arbitrators were aware
of a governing legal principle that they ignored or refused to ap-
ply.279  Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court’s confirmation
of the award.280
271. Id.
272. Id. at 308.
273. Id. at 311.
274. Affinity Fin. Corp. v. AARP Fin., Inc., 468 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
275. Affinity Fin. Corp. v. AARP Fin., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d 117, 118 (D.D.C.
2011).
276. Id. at 118–20.
277. Id. at 120 n.1.
278. Id. at 121–22.  In fact, rather than attempting to overturn the award, the
district court believed that
the respondent here is clearly engaged in an attempt to relitigate each
and every argument that was rejected by the Panel.  By characterizing its
every disagreement with the Panel’s Award as a ‘manifest disregard’ of
the law, the respondent hopes that this court will grant the respondent a
mulligan in the form of de novo review.  The respondent’s arguments run
counter to well-established public policy because de novo review would
undermine the entire concept of arbitration as a private method of resolv-
ing grievances.
Id. at 122.
279. Affinity, 468 F. App’x at 5.
280. Id.
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Lastly, the First Circuit acknowledged its avoidance of the
standard’s viability in Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. v.
Fenyk.281  The plaintiff in Fenyk brought a suit against his former
company, claiming that he was fired based on his sexual orientation
and status as a recovering alcoholic in violation of Vermont em-
ployment laws.282   The defendant moved to compel arbitration, and
the court granted its motion pursuant to a previously signed agree-
ment.283  At the hearing, the plaintiff sought to amend his com-
plaint to add a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act.284
The arbitral panel denied the request to amend but awarded the
plaintiff $600,000 in back pay and $36,042 in attorney’s fees and
costs pursuant to the Florida Civil Rights Act.285   The defendant
moved to vacate the award, and the district court granted the mo-
tion finding that the arbitration panel exceeded its authority by mis-
applying state law and allowing the plaintiff to present his claims
even though the one-year statute of limitations period had
elapsed.286
The First Circuit began its opinion acknowledging that a
court’s evaluation of an arbitral decision is both extraordinarily nar-
row and deferential.287  The court explained that the FAA “speci-
fies a number of grounds that would support an order vacating an
award, including fraud, bias, and prejudicial misbehavior.”288  As to
the existence of an extra-statutory ground for review, the court
explained:
Whether the manifest-disregard doctrine remains good law, how-
ever, is uncertain.  A circuit split has developed following the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Hall Street, which held that § 10 of the
FAA provides the exclusive grounds under the statute for vaca-
tur of arbitration awards.  Although we concluded, in dicta, that
the doctrine is no longer available we have “not squarely deter-
mined whether our manifest disregard case law can be reconciled
with Hall Street.”  We need not resolve the uncertainty over
“manifest disregard” here.289
281. Raymond James Fin. Servs. v. Fenyk, 780 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2015).
282. Id. at 61.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 61–63.
286. Id. at 63.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 64.
289. Id. at 64–65 (citations omitted) (quoting Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp. v.
Mscisz, 601 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2010)).
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Having found that the arbitral award “‘draw[s] its essence
from the contract’ that underlies the arbitration proceeding,” the
court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case
for entry of an order confirming the arbitration award.290
In refusing to weigh in on the validity of the manifest disregard
standard post-Hall Street, the First, Third, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits
silently await guidance from the Supreme Court.  However, as dis-
cussed below,291 the Court has had several opportunities to resolve
this split but has refrained from doing so each time.  An unintended
consequence of these four circuits’ continued refusal to assess the
standard’s viability is the appearance of a calculated, if not cynical,
strategy to refrain from deciding the issue based merely on the pos-
sibility of being overturned on appeal.  Until the matter is resolved,
parties may hesitate to participate in arbitration in those circuits
given the uncertainty of both the decision’s finality and the availa-
bility of non-statutory grounds to challenge awards.
Interestingly, in addition to being in agreement as to refusing
to decide whether manifest disregard remains viable post-Hall
Street, these circuits also agree as to that standard’s actual meaning.
The Tenth Circuit in DMA International interpreted the standard to
mean “‘willful inattentiveness to the governing law.’”292  The court
explained that the record must show that the arbitrator “knew the
law and explicitly disregarded it.”  The Third Circuit in Bapu Corp.
did not define the standard, but instead quoted one of its pre-Hall
Street decisions in which the court stated that the standard applies
“where an arbitration panel manifestly disregards, rather than
merely erroneously interprets, the law.”293  The D.C. Circuit ex-
pounded on this understanding, explaining that in order to establish
that an arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law, the moving
party must show not only that the arbitrator knew of the governing
legal principle and refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, but
also that the law was “well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable
to the case.”294  Finally, the First Circuit described the standard as
290. Id. at 68 (quoting Cytyc Corp. v. DEKA Prods. Ltd. P’ship, 439 F.3d 27,
32 (1st Cir. 2006)).
291. See infra Part III.A.
292. DMA Int’l, Inc. v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 585 F.3d 1341, 1344–45
(10th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).  The court futher explained that “mere errors
in an arbitrator’s factual findings, or in his interpretation and application of the
law, do not justify vacatur.” Id.
293. Bapu Corp. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 371 F. App’x 306, 309 (3d Cir.
2010) (quoting Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch Energy Servs., 409 F.3d 574,
578 (3d Cir. 2005)).
294. Affinity Fin. Corp. v. AARP Fin., Inc., 468 F. App’x 4, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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requiring situations where an award contradicted unambiguous
contract language or the arbitrator recognized but ignored the ap-
plicable law.295
4. A Split Within the Circuit Split
While the circuit courts discussed above each fall into one of
the three noted categories regarding the validity of the manifest dis-
regard standard, a split within this split also appears to exist.  The
Sixth Circuit stands alone as the only circuit that has held both that
the manifest disregard standard still applies and—in a subsequent
decision—that the circuit has yet to reach a final decision on the
issue.
The Sixth Circuit addressed the ramifications of Hall Street in
Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C.,296 a case that involved a failed
licensing agreement between Coffee Beanery, and two business
partners who later assigned their rights and obligations to WW,
L.L.C.297  After opening in 2003, WW’s cafe began encountering
numerous difficulties which ultimately led to an arbitration demand
against Coffee Beanery alleging, among other claims, fraud and
breach of contract.298  The arbitrator issued an award in favor of
Coffee Beanery on all claims, and the district court confirmed.299
WW appealed, arguing that the arbitrator acted in manifest disre-
gard of the law when it refused to apply the Maryland Franchise
Act’s provision that requires an offering prospectus to identify all
officers who have been convicted of a felony—something that Cof-
fee Beanery had failed to do.300
The Sixth Circuit explained that under Wilko, a court “may . . .
vacate an award found to be in manifest disregard of the law.”301
The court found that although Hall Street may have “significantly
reduced the ability of federal courts to vacate arbitration awards for
reasons other than those specified in 9 U.S.C. § 10 . . . it did not
foreclose federal courts’ review for an arbitrator’s manifest disre-
gard of the law.”302  The Sixth Circuit understood the Hall Street
decision to forbid private parties from contractually adding to the
FAA’s grounds for vacatur but not to prohibit judicially invoked
295. Raymond, 780 F.3d at 64.
296. Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415 (6th Cir. 2008).
297. Id. at 416.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 417–18.
300. Id. at 418.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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application of that standard.303  Therefore, “[i]n light of the Su-
preme Court’s hesitation to reject the ‘manifest disregard’ doctrine
in all circumstances,” the Sixth Circuit found that “it would be im-
prudent to cease employing such a universally recognized
principle.”304
Turning to the arbitrator’s decision, the Sixth Circuit explained
that under the Maryland Franchise Act, an offering prospectus
must indicate whether any person identified in the prospectus had
been convicted of a felony.305  Because an officer of Coffee
Beanery had been previously convicted of grand larceny, the court
found that the arbitrator had acted in manifest disregard of the law
when it “expressly chose not to follow clearly established law re-
garding the disclosure of [the officer’s] prior felony.”306  The court
therefore reversed the district court’s judgment and vacated the ar-
bitrator’s award.307
The Sixth Circuit continued to apply the manifest disregard
standard three times in 2008.308  Nevertheless, behind the scenes
the Sixth Circuit wrestled with the propriety of its continued appli-
cation of the manifest disregard standard post-Hall Street as seen in
Ozormoor v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,309 when the court expressed
“some doubt whether this theory remains a cognizable one after
Hall Street.”310  However, the court continued, “the Supreme Court
has not expressly rejected the theory.”311  And in any event, the
303. Id. at 419.
304. Id. (“It is worth noting that since Wilko, every federal appellate court has
allowed for the vacatur of an award based on an arbitrator’s manifest disregard of
the law.”).
305. Id. at 420.
306. Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App’x at 421.
307. Id.
308. For example, in Dealer Computer Services v. Dub Herring Ford, the
court, while addressing whether an arbitral panel had properly interpreted the ar-
bitration clause at issue as prohibiting class arbitration, explained that “[a] court
may also vacate an award on non-statutory grounds if the arbitration panel demon-
strates a ‘manifest disregard of the law.’”  547 F.3d 558, 561 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008).
Later that same year, the Sixth Circuit stated in Grain v. Trinity Health, Mercy
Health Services, Inc. that although manifest disregard of the law was not a ground
for modifying an award under 9 U.S.C. § 11, it remained “a basis for vacating an
award.”  551 F.3d 374, 380 (6th Cir. 2008).  Finally, in Martin Marietta Materials,
Inc. v. Bank of Oklahoma, the Sixth Circuit stated that “the ‘manifest disregard’
standard continues to apply to cases under the Federal Arbitration Act . . . .”  304
F. App’x 360, 362–63 (6th Cir. 2008).
309. Ozormoor v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 459 F. App’x 502 (6th Cir. 2012).
310. Id. at 505.
311. Id.
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court found that the appellants failed to establish that the arbitrator
had acted in manifest disregard of the law.312
The Sixth Circuit soon reversed course, or at least suggested a
detour, in Schafer v. Multiband Corp.313  The plaintiffs in Schafer
brought an action in arbitration for indemnification against their
parent company for payments that they made to settle several
breach of fiduciary duty claims.314  While the arbitrator cited nu-
merous federal cases that held the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) permitted indemnification agree-
ments,315 he nevertheless ruled in favor of the company and de-
clared the agreements invalid.316  The appellees moved to have the
award vacated, and the district court granted their motion finding
the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law by deciding
that ERISA did not allow the indemnification agreements.317
The Sixth Circuit began its opinion by acknowledging that the
arbitrator’s decision did not fall under any of the factors listed in
section 10 of the FAA.318  Moreover, although the Sixth Circuit had
regularly applied the manifest disregard standard prior to this case,
the court attempted to limit those decisions, explaining that while
the court had “continued to acknowledge ‘manifest disregard’ as a
ground for vacatur,” it had done so only in unpublished deci-
sions.319  It was therefore the court’s belief that “[t]he issue has not
been firmly settled” in the Sixth Circuit.320  However, rather than
seizing the opportunity to settle the issue, the court found that it
“need not decide whether a manifest disregard of the law legiti-
mately forms a basis for vacatur in the first place” because “[e]ven
under the standard, a ‘general review for an arbitrator’s legal er-
rors’ is not permitted.”321  Therefore, the court reversed the district
court’s judgment and remanded the case.322
312. Id. at 506.
313. Schafer v. Multiband Corp., 551 F. App’x 814 (2014).
314. Id. at 815–17.
315. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2018).  Congress enacted ERISA to establish a com-
prehensive federal scheme for the protection of pension plan participants and their
beneficiaries.  Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co. Profit Sharing Plan, 207 F.3d 1143,
1148 (9th Cir. 2000).
316. Schafer, 551 F. App’x at 817–18.
317. Id. at 818.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 819 n.1.
320. Id. at 819.
321. Id. at 818–19 (quoting Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S.
576, 585 (2008)).
322. Id. at 820–21.
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III. MISSED OPPORTUNITIES TO RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Legal scholars quickly noted the conflict among the circuits re-
garding the manifest disregard standard.323  Not surprisingly, the
circuit courts also soon acknowledged this conflict.  In Stolt-Nielsen,
for instance, the Second Circuit explained that since Hall Street,
“[s]ome [circuits] have concluded or suggested that the doctrine
simply does not survive,” while “[o]thers think that ‘manifest disre-
gard,’ reconceptualized as a judicial gloss on the specific grounds
for vacatur enumerated in section 10 of the FAA, remains a valid
ground for vacating arbitration awards.”324  Similarly, the Sixth Cir-
cuit explained that because of Hall Street, “our sister circuits have
suggested different answers to the question whether the ‘manifest
disregard’ standard retains continuing vitality.”325  The Fifth Circuit
also acknowledged the emerging split in Citigroup.326  This rapidly
growing discord led at least one commentator to suggest:
[T]his latest circuit split, developed less than one year after Hall
Street, is heading to the Supreme Court.  The Court will have to
decide whether, under the FAA, “manifest disregard” is a statu-
tory ground for review, and thus permissible, or an extra-statu-
tory ground, and thus prohibited under Hall Street.327
Unfortunately, this prediction has not yet come to fruition, and
the result has created an uncertainty as to the finality of arbitral
awards based solely on which circuit a party finds itself in.  This
uncertainty has led to more complex and expensive forum-shopping
disputes, which already presented problems pre-Hall Street328 and
323. See, e.g., Jill I. Gross, Hall Street Blues: The Uncertain Future of the Man-
ifest Disregard, 37 SEC. REG. L.J. 232, 233 (2009) (“In the short time since Hall
Street, a new circuit split has emerged on the question of whether manifest disre-
gard of the law survives Hall Street as a valid ground to vacate an award under the
FAA.”); Annie Chen, The Doctrine of Manifest Disregard of the Law After Hall
Street: Implications for Judicial Review of  International Arbitrations in U.S.
Courts, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1872, 1875 (2008) (“Since Hall Street, U.S. circuit
courts have disagreed on the status of manifest disregard, leaving the doctrine
highly unsettled.”).
324. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir.
2008).
325. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Bank of Okla., 304 F. App’x 360, 362
(6th Cir. 2008).
326. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 356–57 (5th Cir.
2009).
327. Gross, supra note 323, at 239.
328. Jean R. Sternlight, Forum Shopping for Arbitration Decisions: Federal
Courts’ Use of Antisuit Injunctions Against State Courts, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 91
(1998) (“Arbitration clauses, which are supposed to do away with litigation, have
ironically spawned many complicated and expensive court fights.  Some of the
most complex cases involve both forum shopping by the parties . . . .”).
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became more of an issue thereafter.329  It has likewise created a
situation at the state level where California, through case law, and
New Jersey, through statute, now explicitly permit parties to con-
tract for expanded judicial review in response to the Hall Street de-
cision;330 other states, such as Tennessee, do not.331
With this continued discord over the availability of the mani-
fest disregard standard, parties desiring greater availability of ap-
pellate review must now take pause when considering where to
designate the seat of an arbitration.  Not only have several federal
circuits refrained from addressing the issue, but as one commenta-
tor noted, “[t]his exercise in forum shopping . . . carries some risk as
not all state courts have weighed in on the issue.”332  Challenging
an award in a court that has not ruled on the issue can be the legal
equivalent of a roll of the dice.  To avoid this uncertainty, arbitra-
tion organizations have created private appellate arbitration panels
whose rules allow parties to challenge arbitration awards under
what would otherwise constitute an improper expanded review pro-
vision.333  But rather than alleviating the seemingly endless confu-
sion, this practice essentially thwarts the congressional intent
behind the FAA:  to provide the judicial system some, albeit lim-
ited, ability to review an arbitral award.  It is no wonder that soon
after the Hall Street ruling, the Court found itself again faced with
the issue of the manifest disregard standard.
A. The Four Cert Petitions
Within a year of its decision in Hall Street, the Supreme Court
received three petitions for a writ of certiorari concerning the via-
bility of the manifest disregard standard.  Those petitions argued
that although Congress enacted the FAA to create a national policy
favoring arbitration,
[t]he Circuits’ treatment of the doctrine of manifest disregard of
the law . . . has been anything but uniform.  Since this Court’s
decision in Hall Street, the Circuits have divided at least three
329. See generally Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and
Prospects for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929
(2010) (discussing how the Hall Street decision invites forum shopping for state
arbitration statutes where expanded review is allowed).
330. Becky L. Jacobs, Pugh’s Lawn and Landscape Company, Inc. v. Jaycon
Development Corporation: The Tennessee Court of Appeals Limits Judicial Review
of Arbitration Awards, 11 TRANSACTIONS 199, 213–14 (2009).
331. Id. at 207.
332. Id. at 213.
333. Paul R. Genender & Christopher D. Kratovil, Recent Developments in
the Law of Arbitration, 30 TEX. BUS. LITIG. J. 5 (2008).
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ways over whether manifest disregard of the law . . . remains a
valid ground for vacating an arbitrator’s award under the
FAA.334
Moreover, the petitioners believed that the issue was ripe for the
Court’s intervention:
There is no benefit to allowing this issue to percolate further in
the lower courts.  The circuit split is deep, and it will not resolve
without intervention by this Court.  The Circuits have considered
both this Court’s decision and their own precedent, and have
concluded that their respective positions are binding in their cir-
cuits . . . . Until this court intervenes, parties to arbitration agree-
ments will encounter different sets of rules on the federal courts,
based solely on where their arbitrations are held.335
This argument appears to have fallen on deaf ears.  On October 5,
2009, the Supreme Court denied all three petitions336 thereby al-
lowing the split to continue either in hopes that future case law will
provide consistency among the circuits or in wait for the hold-outs
to address the issue.337
Predictably, as additional circuits ruled on the issue and the
split grew, the Court was once again presented with an opportunity
to clarify its holding in Hall Street.  On December 13, 2013, the de-
fendant in Dewan338 petitioned the Court arguing:
The courts of appeals are divided . . . over whether “manifest
disregard” survived Hall Street.  This divergence is untenable, as
it subjects arbitral awards to different standards of review based
entirely on the happenstance of where they are rendered.  The
conflict is also entrenched: the courts of appeals have acknowl-
edged their irreconcilable positions, but each has concluded that
it has the best reading of this Court’s precedents.  Thus, certiorari
is the only way to establish uniformity on this critical question of
federal law.339
334. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW,
L.L.C., 558 U.S. 819 (2009) (No. 08-1396).
335. Id. at 23–24.
336. See Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 558 U.S. 819 (2009); Comedy
Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 558 U.S. 824 (2009); Grain v. Trinity Health,
Mercy Health Servs., 558 U.S. 820 (2009).
337. James E. Berger & Charlene Sun, Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in
Three Cases Concerning Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, STAY CURRENT (Paul,
Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP, L.A., Cal.), Oct. 2009, at 1, http://bit.ly/
2pblkG0.
338. Dewan v. Walia, 134 S. Ct. 1788 (2014); see also supra Part II.B.1.
339. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12, Dewan v. Walia, 134 S. Ct. 1788
(2014) (No. 13-722).
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But alas, apparently unmoved by this argument, the Court de-
clined Walia’s petition, thereby allowing the dispute to endure.340
B. Stolt-Nielsen
The Court was presented with perhaps its best opportunity to
resolve the schism when it granted certiorari in Stolt-Nielsen.341  As
discussed above,342 the district court in Stolt-Nielsen vacated an ar-
bitral award, finding that the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard
of the law when it failed to conduct a choice-of-law analysis before
concluding that the parties’ arbitration agreement permitted class
arbitration.343  The Second Circuit reversed, explaining that while
the manifest disregard standard had survived Hall Street, the arbi-
trator had not acted improperly because the petitioners had failed
to cite any authority demonstrating that federal maritime rule or
custom and usage barred the use of class arbitration.344
The Supreme Court, however, believed that applying the mani-
fest disregard standard, valid or not, was unnecessary to decide the
case.  Instead, the Court turned its attention to section 10(a)(4) of
the FAA, explaining that the arbitration panel exceeded its powers
because its “task . . . is to interpret and enforce a contract, not to
make public policy.”345  In contrast to the Second Circuit’s decision,
the Supreme Court explained that the arbitration panel failed to
identify and apply maritime or New York law, and instead “im-
posed its own policy choice.”346  In fact, in reversing the Second
Circuit’s decision, Justice Alito’s majority opinion chose only to ad-
dress the manifest disregard standard once in a footnote where he
curtly wrote that the Court “do[es] not decide whether ‘manifest
disregard’ survives our decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v.
Mattel, Inc., as an independent ground for review or as a judicial
gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U. S. C.
§ 10.”347  This statement was surprising, if not disappointing, given
that Justice Alito had joined Justice Souter’s majority opinion in
Hall Street and certainly understood the confusion that the opinion
had created.348  Similarly, Justice Ginsberg, who was likewise a
340. See id.
341. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
342. See supra Part II.B.1.
343. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 669.
344. Id. at 670.
345. Id. at 672.
346. Id. at 676–77.
347. Id. at 672 n.3.
348. One court went as far as to sarcastically praise the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Stolt-Nielsen for “so helpfully stat[ing] . . . ‘[w]e do not decide whether
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member of the Hall Street majority, did not mention the manifest
disregard standard in her dissent.349
However, Justice Alito’s refusal to endorse the manifest disre-
gard standard did not indicate that he believed the standard was
invalid, as demonstrated by the footnote’s conclusion:  “Assuming,
arguendo, that such a standard applies, we find it satisfied for the
reasons that follow.”350  Interestingly, this last statement—that
even if the manifest disregard standard remains valid, the Court’s
decision would not change—captures a position set forth by several
scholars discussed below:  application of the manifest disregard
standard has shown no statistical consequence in a court’s ability to
overturn an arbitral decision.
C. The Practical Effects of Manifest Disregard
In delivering the opinion in Hall Street, Justice Souter acknowl-
edged that the Court did not know whether the ruling would en-
courage or discourage parties from choosing to arbitrate their
disputes.351  Although it remains unclear whether the Court’s deci-
sion has had any impact on parties choosing to arbitrate their
claims, the preclusion of a party’s ability to allege manifest disre-
gard in several circuits has not led to a sudden increase in arbitral
awards confirmations.  This phenomenon was demonstrated in a
2011 study by Professor Michael H. LeRoy in which LeRoy ex-
amined challenges to employment arbitration awards in both fed-
eral and state courts from 1975 to 2010.352   The study found that
district courts confirmed a similar percentage of arbitration awards
both prior to and after Hall Street, and that state courts confirmed a
slightly higher number of awards after Hall Street.353
‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in Hall Street.’”  Goldman Sachs Execu-
tion & Clearing, L.P. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. of Bayou Grp., 758
F. Supp. 2d 222, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
349. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 688–99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
350. Id. at 672 n.3.
351. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 589 (2008) (“We
do not know who, if anyone, is right, and so cannot say whether the exclusivity
reading of the statute is more of a threat to the popularity of arbitrators or to that
of courts.”).
352. See Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The “Manifest
Disregard of the Law” Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 178 (2011).
353. Id.  The study found that pre-Hall Street, 164 out of 175, or 93.7 percent,
of arbitration awards were confirmed, whereas post-Hall Street, this number de-
clined to 30 out of 33, or 90.9 percent.  Surprisingly, state first-level court rulings
increased.  Pre-Hall Street state courts confirmed 96 out of 122, or 78.7 percent,
arbitration awards, and after Hall Street was decided state courts confirmed 20 out
of 24, or 83.3 percent, arbitration awards. Id.
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Additionally, Professor LeRoy’s study found that the rate of
confirmations by federal appeals courts stayed about the same after
Hall Street.354  Moreover, while state appellate courts did see an in-
crease in confirmations post-Hall Street, the increase was not statis-
tically significant due to the small sample size of cases used in the
study.355
The New York City Bar Association released a study the fol-
lowing year focusing on the effect of the manifest disregard stan-
dard’s availability on cases within the Second Circuit.356  That study
took statistics that the Second Circuit gathered four years prior and
extended the data through 2012.  The study explained that the Sec-
ond Circuit had conducted its own statistical analysis of the mani-
fest disregard doctrine in the 2003 case Duferco International Steel
Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S,357 in which the court found
that since adopting the standard in 1960, the Second Circuit vacated
only four of the 48 cases in which the standard was applied.358  The
Second Circuit updated its statistics in 2008, noting that since its
decision in Duferco, it heard 18 cases involving manifest disregard
challenges but only vacated one and remanded two others for clari-
fication.359  The Bar Association’s study, through its own research,
explained that the Second Circuit had heard 17 additional manifest
disregard cases in the three years since Stolt-Nielsen but had not
vacated a single award on that basis.360  Likewise, at the federal
district court level, the study explained that out of 367 manifest dis-
regard challenges, courts vacated or partially vacated awards in
only 17 cases and remanded five others—a mere six percent of all
cases.361  Moreover, the Second Circuit reversed six of those 22
cases on the ground that the standard for manifest disregard had
not been satisfied.362
354. Id. at 179.  Specifically, federal appeals courts reviewing arbitration
awards confirmed 79 out of 90, or 87.8 percent, of arbitration awards pre-Hall
Street.  After Hall Street, federal courts confirmed 6 out of 7, or 85.7 percent, arbi-
tration awards.
355. Id.  State appeals courts confirmed 73 out of 103, or 70.9 percent, of arbi-
tration awards pre-Hall Street, and confirmed 16 out of 18, or 88.9 percent, arbitra-
tions awards post-Hall Street.
356. COMM. ON INT’L COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, THE “MANIFEST DISREGARD
OF LAW” DOCTRINE AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK 6 (2012).
357. Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v. T. Klavness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383 (2d
Cir. 2003).
358. Id. at 389.
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Not surprisingly, while application of the manifest disregard
standard may have no significant effect on the confirmation of arbi-
tral awards, it often leads to an increase in the overall cost of arbi-
tration.363  As Professor LeRoy explained in an earlier study, the
manifest disregard standard “wastes more judicial resources in re-
viewing awards than any other standard.”364  This fact clearly runs
counter to one of the central advantages of arbitration—namely,
“an efficient and cost-effective alternative to traditional litiga-
tion.”365   Therefore, it would seem that despite the arguments in
favor of the Supreme Court resolving the circuit split, the availabil-
ity of the manifest disregard standard not only has little effect on a
party’s ability to confirm an arbitral award, but also removes one of
the key advantages of arbitration by increasing its cost.
So, what is the lasting effect, if any, of the manifest disregard
standard?  Parties choose arbitration because it is a cost-efficient
means for resolving disputes and a faster alternative to litigation; it
also has finality that court decisions lack.  The availability of the
manifest disregard standard renders arbitration a mere prelude to
meaningless litigation,366 destroys efficiency,367 and increases ex-
penses.368  In short, the very advantages that Congress envisioned
363. See generally Brief of the International Franchise Ass’n as Amicus Cu-
riae in Support of Petitioners at 10, Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, LLC, 558 U.S.
819 (2009) (No. 08-1396) (“The possibility of vacatur for manifest disregard also
threatens arbitration’s essential benefits of speed, cost-effectiveness and efficiency
. . . .”).
364. Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Happily Never After: When Final and
Binding Arbitration Has No Fairy Tale Ending, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 167, 189
(2008).
365. Christopher L. Frost, Welcome to the Jungle: Rethinking the Amount in
Controversy in a Petition to Vacate an Arbitration Award Under the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 227, 230 (2005). Indeed, it was this very point that
formed the basis for the core argument for ripeness made by the International
Franchise Association in its amicus curiae brief in support of the petitioners in the
Coffee Beanery’s cert petition. See Brief of the International Franchise Ass’n as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 363, at 9 (“This is an impor-
tant issue because the possibility of manifest disregard review may decrease the
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of arbitration as a means for resolving disputes.”).
366. Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration’s Finality
Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 132 (2002) (“[S]ubstantive re-
view of arbitration awards would render arbitration a meaningless precursor to
litigation . . . .”).
367. Michael P. O’Mullan, Seeking Consistency in Judicial Review of Securities
Arbitration: An Analysis of the Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard, 64 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1121, 1148 (1995) (“The courts’ attempts to articulate a workable
standard of judicial review for legal error in arbitration reflect the fundamental
conflict between the speed, informality, and economic efficiency of arbitration and
the exhaustive legal precision of the litigation process.”).
368. Id. at 1135 (noting the use of the manifest disregard standard “result[s] in
undue expense and delay in the arbitration process.”).
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when it passed the FAA are defeated by the application of this non-
statutory standard while the parties to the dispute receive little to
no tangible benefits.
CONCLUSION
During oral arguments in Hall Street, Justice Breyer explained
that he had earlier referred to the dispute as “the case of the cen-
tury, because it’s going to take a hundred years to finish.”369  While
only a decade has passed since the Court’s decision in that case, the
Court’s refusal to settle the circuit split has left many scholars re-
signed to the fact that it may take a century to resolve the debate.370
In the meantime state and federal courts “face[ ] this question an
average of once a week”371 with no guidance from the Supreme
Court.372  However, rather than asking if the standard has survived
the Hall Street decision, a better question might be:  should it have
existed at all?
The manifest disregard standard entered the arbitration lexi-
con through dicta in Wilko in which the Supreme Court distin-
guished between an arbitrator’s erroneous interpretation of law—
which is not subject to judicial review—and an arbitrator’s manifest
disregard of the law—which is.373  While manifest disregard is not
found in section 10 of the FAA, every circuit court nevertheless
gradually adopted it over the following 40 years.374  However, the
Court’s 2008 decision in Hall Street, which held that section 10 of
the FAA provides the “exclusive” grounds for vacatur, broke that
uniformity.375  Following Hall Street, a four-way circuit split devel-
oped, with some circuit courts permitting the use of manifest disre-
369. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 163, at 40.
370. See, e.g., Patrick Sweeney, Exceeding Their Powers: A Critique of Stolt-
Nielsen and Manifest Disregard, and a Proposal for Substantive Arbitral Award
Review, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1571, 1637 (2014) (“Manifest disregard has a
turbulent history and is currently in a state of limbo.”); Liz Kramer, Circuit Split
Persists Regarding Whether Arbitrator’s “Manifest Disregard” of Law Can Vacate
Arbitration Award, ARBITRATION NATION (June 25, 2015), http://bit.ly/2NI9ykh
(“There was a circuit split then, and that circuit split has not gone away . . . [with]
no clear majority on whether the basis is valid.”).
371. Hiro N. Aragaki, The Mess of Manifest Disregard, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE
1 (2009).
372. See Katherine A. Helm, The Expanding Scope of Judicial Review of Ar-
bitration Awards: Where Does the Buck Stop?, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2006–Jan.
2007, at 16, 21 (“Bereft of Supreme Court guidance, the federal circuit courts have
continued to fend for themselves when it comes to challenges to arbitration awards
based on manifest disregard of the law.”).
373. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
374. See supra Part I.B.
375. Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008).
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gard, others holding that the standard was no longer available,
another circuit holding that the standard both does and does not
survive Hall Street, and three remaining circuits refusing to decide
the issue one way or the other.376  This split, which resulted from
the Court’s continued equivocation on the standard’s viability, has
weakened any legitimacy that the standard once enjoyed.377
But does the split matter?  When parties seek to vacate arbitral
awards, they usually rely on the full array of defenses listed in sec-
tion 10 of the FAA and only invoke manifest disregard as one of
several alternative grounds.378  What’s more, a comparison of the
confirmation rates of arbitral awards before and after Hall Street
shows that courts still confirm an exceptionally high percentage of
awards.379  Thus, the availability of the manifest disregard standard
appears to not have much practical effect in terms of vacating an
award but instead causes delay in the award’s enforcement while
driving up the cost of litigation for the winning party.380  Neverthe-
less, the debate over whether the standard should stand as a valid
ground for arbitral review will likely continue until the Supreme
Court addresses the issue.  Until then, practitioners will have the
ability to forum shop for jurisdictions that apply the standard favor-
ably to preserve the option of invoking the standard to overturn an
unfavorable award.381
376. See supra Part II.B.1–4.
377. Kevin Patrick Murphy, Alive but Not Well: Manifest Disregard After Hall
Street, 44 GA. L. REV. 285, 303 (2009) (“[W]hile the Supreme Court [in Hall
Street] certainly weakened the legitimacy of manifest disregard as an independent
ground for vacatur, it did not take the opportunity to abrogate it when it easily
could have.”).
378. COMM. ON INT’L COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 356, at 7.
379. See supra Part III.C.
380. Stephen L. Hayford, Reining in the “Manifest Disregard” of the Law
Standard: The Key to Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL.
117, 132–33 (1998) (“[Manifest disregard] destabilizes the process of commercial
arbitration, increasing costs and time to resolution in many cases by providing dis-
appointed advocates and parties with an illusory promise of securing justice from a
court of law when they believe they have been denied it in arbitration.”).
381. Kate Kennedy, Manifest Disregard in Arbitration Awards: A Manifesta-
tion of Appeals Versus a Disregard for Just Resolutions, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 417, 446
(2008) (“The lack of a uniform application of the manifest disregard standard has
created an atmosphere ripe for forum shopping.”).
